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![[info]](http://l-stat.livejournal.com/img/syndicated.gif) flybottle | |
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http://www.willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2009/12/07/can-the-big-cutoff-settle-the-science/ http://www.willwilkinson.net/flybottle/?p=3919 Paul Hsieh’s letter to editor in today’s WSJ responding to an op-ed by MIT climate scientist Richard Lindzen is a model of succinctness:
If a respected MIT scientist like Mr. Lindzen argues that “the science isn’t settled,” and other scientists disagree, then doesn’t the very dispute itself prove that the science isn’t settled?
Paul Hsieh
Sedalia, Colo.
Richard Rorty infamously said that “Truth is what your contemporaries let you get away with saying.” Among the many things wrong with this claim is that is false by its own standard; many of Rorty’s contemporaries did not in fact let him get away with saying this. When confronted with this rather serious problem Rorty sometimes seems to have wanted to say “Oh, well not those contemporaries.” But he was far too smart to just come out and say that. Anyway, that’s the kind of move the “the science is settled” people often seem tempted to make. If an evidently qualified scientist says that the science is not settled, his or her opinion ipso facto does not count. But in that case, “the science is settled” means something rather different than what it means to most competent speakers of the English language. First, it implies the idea that there is a set of scientists who count. Second, it implies a rule that determines who counts: one must have the right kind of scientific training, a record of serious scholarship, and agree that the science is settled. To think that Richard Lindzen’s disagreement with the claim that “the science is settled” could possibly matter is simply to misunderstand what “the science is settled” means to those who have yet to experience “the Big Cutoff.”
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econlib | |
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http://econlog.econlib.org/archives/2009/12/trial_and_error.html Atul Gawande says something I believe to be true and something I believe to be false. What I believe to be true:
To figure out how to transform medical communities, with all their diversity and complexity, is going to involve trial and error.
What I believe to be false:
Getting our medical communities, town by town, to improve care and control costs isn't a task that we've asked government to take on before. But we have no choice. At this point, we can't afford any illusions: the system won't fix itself,
Gawande has no concept of the relative ability of government and markets to deal with ambiguity. He thinks that markets are unable to adopt new processes without government pressure. He thinks that government is well equipped to experiment.
There indeed are examples of markets that do not evolve effectively. There are examples of government-led experiments that pay off. But mostly it is the other way around. The incentives work much better in markets. In markets, the tendency is to reward success and to punish failure. In government, failed programs persist, and success receives no special reward.
For the pointer, thanks to Peter Orszag
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econlib | |
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http://econlog.econlib.org/archives/2009/12/calomiris_on_th_1.html I posted last month on one part of Russ Roberts' interview with Charles Calomiris. Some of the commenters highly recommended the whole podcast and I agree. I've listened to it twice all the way through and taken notes. Calomiris often writes articles in the Wall Street Journal, but I tend to find them dense. He's an amazingly clear interviewee, though, and Russ Roberts is establishing himself as the Brian Lamb of economics with, to boot, a Ph.D. and 30 years of experience as an economist. And now that I know how good Calomiris is, I'll work my way through his articles. These are particularly important issues now, given that Congress seems hell-bent on regulation rather than on reversing the many perverse incentives that Calomiris talks about. To give one example of how it has changed my views, I had a clever, cutesy line in the fall of 2008 when I was opposing the bailout. I said, "I favored getting rid of the FDIC, but not this week." Well, after hearing Calomiris, I favor getting rid of it this week.
Here are some of my notes, with the times if you want to go straight to that segment.
2:40: To get a banking crisis, there must be something wrong with microeconomic incentives.
3:15: People with bad credit can get no money down with no documentation. Government policies that contributed to this were FHA lending, pressures on Fannie and Freddie, and state government programs.
4:17: The SEC proposed regulations in 2007 to make it harder for ratings agencies to be tough on mortgage-backed securities that were subprime.
4:55: Credit card securitization has been going on for a long time. But that market didn't collapse. Why the difference between that and mortgage securitization? The incentives established by government programs were a big part of the reason.
7:45: From 1874 to 1913, there was a lot of globalization. But worldwide there were only 4 big banking crises.
9:00: From 1978 to now, there have been 140 big banking crises, defined the same way as the earlier ones: total losses of banks in a country equalling or greater than 10% of GDP.
13:00: The founding of the Federal Reserve did reduce the frequency of bank panics, but one main reason we had so many bank failures before the Fed was primitive (my word, not his) laws that required unit banking.
15:00: Unit banking is the requirement that banks be one unit, not have branches, not just across state lines, but within state lines. [Me talking now, not Charles: I remember my friend Harry Watson, when he joined the faculty at the University of Chicago, pointing out that the big First National Bank of Chicago downtown having one branch--itself in that building.] Unit banking made it hard to diversify risk, thus causing many bank failures. Canada had branch banking from 1860 on and had no bank failures or panics.
16:20: The reason above is why central banking in the U.S. was helpful: not because it offset market failure but because it offset other government regulation.
18:00: We didn't get these banking failures earlier than 1979 because deposit insurance, which Franklin Roosevelt opposed, wasn't nearly as substantial back then as it had become by the late 1970s.
19:10: Henry Steagall of Alabama favored deposit insurance in the 1930s to help small banks. They could compete more easily with Uncle Sam standing behind them. Do you recognize his name?
20:40: Deposit insurance per deposit increased to $100K in 1980.
21:10: Alan Blinder helped invent CDARS and a firm that he is involved with is collecting royalties on the patent for CDARS.
23:30: Notice that deposit insurance went from being small and temporary to being a blanket protection.
25:20: Milton Friedman and Anna J. Schwartz thought deposit insurance was a good idea. :-(
26:00: An interesting way to protect small depositors without deposit insurance is to reintroduce postal savings accounts.
26:40: Deposit insurance was reduced (de facto) in Mexico during the 1990s financial crisis and that caused risk to fall. Here's where I started thinking that we should end FDIC sooner rather than later.
27:45: Interesting story about England. The Economist supported the Bank of England in no longer backing the debt of the banks. As a result, after this reform, banking crises in Britain were non-existent between 1866 and 1914.
31:15: The history of banking crises is the history of perverse incentives set up by the government.
31:50: Depositors no longer have skin in the game and so we need to depend on regulators.
32:30: Subsidizing risk in housing market while not tracking risk with "prudential" regulation. This is a big one.
33:00: He claims monetary policy in the early 2000s was loose, measured by interest rates. Here I think he's wrong. To see why, look at Henderson and Hummel.
35:00: In 2004, Fannie and Freddie decide to get into no-doc mortgages. What happened to the most vocal risk manager who said, "Don't do it."? He was fired.
36:00: Why do people sometimes underestimate Fannie's and Freddie's loss exposure in the sub-prime market? Because they get confused by labeling. Sub-prime is not a labeling issue but a performance issue.
38:50: What fraction of the losses are due to no-docs? Half. What fraction are related to assumption that housing prices could never fall? Half.
40:00: By what date did it become clear that the basic assumptions underlying the subprime mortgages were wrong? By middle of 2006.
41:20: What did Deutsche Bank and Goldman Sachs do? Made sure they were covered for this risk.
42:10: What did Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, UBS, Merrill, and Citibank do in late 2006 and early 2007? Kept buying.
44:00: What were the execs at Fannie and Freddie thinking? They needed to defend themselves from criticisms by U.S. Treasury (Clinton and Bush), Alan Greenspan, and some Republican politicians.
45:30: What was Fannie's and Freddie's "insurance policy?" Please Barney Frank.
46:00: Which of the banks were worst at creating value for stockholders? At ethics? UBS and Citibank.
48:00: Why were some bank managers doing these investments when they should have known better? He says that regulation makes these banks "relatively immune to corporate governance." The 1940 Bank Holding Act limited concentrated ownership of banks.
49:00: Why don't we have concentrated ownership of banks? The regulations don't allow hedge funds and private investors to own large stakes in banks.
50:20: The argument for preventing concentrated ownership is a "lawyer's" argument that concentrated ownership is bad. The economist's perspective is that concentrated ownership is good.
52:30: Economist Jeff Sachs advised the Poles in the early 1990s to have concentrated ownership of banks when they moved away from Communism.
53:30: Hedge funds and investment funds are barred from becoming controlling investors in banks.
55:20: The ratings agencies were willing to pretend that the mortgage-backed securities were AAA long after they knew better because they were catering, not to the sellers of the securities, but to the buyers of the securities.
57:30: The grade inflation in the securities markets was in the securitization-related markets, not the corporate debt market, because the buyers wanted loosened constraints.
58:40: Why does grade inflation work only if the buy side wants grade inflation? Because if, say, Moody's is the toughest and the sponsor drops the sell side, then buyer knows that. So buy side wants it to be that way.
59:40: "Why did you buy it [some crap investment]?" Answer: "We have to put our money to work." He explains further in 1:01:30 below.
1:00:00: Note the distinction between hedge funds on the one hand and pensions, mutuals, etc. on the other. Note the difference in incentives.
1:01:30: "If you're making your 1% on assets, you want your assets to be large."
1:03:00: Regulation was "outsourced" to the ratings agencies.
1:03:45: Agency problem. "Ratings agencies were a coordination device for plausible deniability."
1:05:40: Mutual funds are not legally allowed to have fee structures like hedge funds: not allowed to have profit sharing in upside only.
1:06:30: No money manager will write a symmetric contract: sharing equally on upside and downside. Reason: no manager with that amount of funds at stake would be willing to take that risk. But they are allowed to have fees that are proportional to assets managed.
1:07:30: We "poor people" can't go to hedge funds.
1:08:00: We don't have everything figured out. But look at what we do have figured out: all the bad policies--deposit insurance that encourage risk taking and regulations that make it hard to control people who invest our money. It's a clusterf**k [my word.]
1:09:20: To their credit, Obama administration has stopped blaming problems on deregulation.
1:09:40: What were the kinds of deregulation that occurred. (1) Ending Regulation Q, which allowed banks to compete for deposits by paying interest. (2) Elimination of restrictions on branch banking. This deregulation stabilize banks. (3) Removal of Glass-Steagall restrictions on banks underwriting corporate securities.
1:10:40: Do banks take risk when they underwrite securities? Not much.
1:11:00: Without any of this deregulation, the banks could have done everything they did that is at issue in this crisis.
1:12:40: In sum, deregulation stabilized the system and had zero effect on the risks taken that caused the crisis.
1:14:15: Gramm-Leach-Bliley had within it a promising measure to make things better. It was to have Fed and Treasury consider a subordinated debt requirement for banks, what Calomiris calls "the greatest promise for restoring some discipline to banking."
1:15:00: Subordinated debt requirement: Have banks raise a % of their funds from lenders (subordinated debt) that would never receive a bank bailout come hell or high water.
1:16:00: Federal Reserve paper said this Gramm proposal made sense.
1:16:50: "Why would any banker want discipline?"
1:17:10: Fed punted on subordinated debt requirement: "More research is needed."
1:18:00: In Obama proposals for financial regulation, failure to measure risk by Basel II is never mentioned.
1:19:00: Basel I and Basel II were in place. They failed. Therefore the problem can't be attributed to deregulation.
1:20:00: "Protecting banks from market discipline is something that populist politics does very well." Calomiris does this nicely.
1:21:00: The investment banks were under Basel II. SEC was the Basel II regulator for the investment banks.
1:21:30: Basel II gave a false sense of security. Risk measurement is not even on the agenda.
1:23:10: Optimistic comment: "Economists agree a lot on these things. Congress might be willing to listen."
1:24:20: What did Fannie Mae pay Joe Stiglitz and Peter Orszag (currently head of Obama's OMB) to do? See my earlier post. What are Fannie and Freddie costing us? $350 billion.
1:25:40: What plan did Fed announce to shrink its current balance sheet? Won't sell, but will engage in reverse repurchase agreements: lend crumby securities in a way that retains all the credit risk.
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c4ss_feed | |
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http://c4ss.org/content/1513 http://c4ss.org/?p=1513 Tareq And Michaele Salahi’s attendance at a White House dinner to which they hadn’t been invited was hardly the first “security breach” at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue. According to the Washington Post, the Secret Service has documented at least 91 such events since 1980.
The moral of the story isn’t that you can’t trust the Salahis. It’s that you can’t trust the government. In the 220 years since “We The People” allegedly “ordained and established” the Constitution, the government created by that Constitution has continuously worked toward exempting itself from the rules, both explicit and implicit, that bind it.
At one time, the very idea of “breaching White House security” didn’t exist. It was understood to be “the public’s house,” and if you felt like dropping in for a visit or a walk around the grounds … or for that matter, a chat with the president … that was your prerogative as a citizen, right up to at the middle of the 20th century.
These days, you can get a guided tour of the house you allegedly own, where your alleged employees work — if you can get one of those alleged employees, to wit “your” congresscritter, to request permission on your behalf for you to visit.
It’s not just about the White House. It’s about your right to use “your” property. You are a member of “the public,” right?
In recent years, what passes for debate has become so ridiculous that a right unambiguously enshrined in the Constitution and acknowledged therein as belonging solely to “the people” and not subject to infringement by any level of government for any reason — the right to keep and bear arms — is seriously held by some not to apply on “public properties” such as courthouses and “national” forests. If “the people” can’t exercise their rights on their own property, where can they exercise them?
The ink was barely dry on the Constitution before government began setting itself apart from, and above, that “We The People” to whom it was supposedly subservient.
In 1792, the federal government, at the urging of then Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton, imposed a tax on whiskey. While the overt arguments for the tax largely centered around paying off government debt (the feds had assumed state debts from the revolution), Hamilton didn’t make any bones about its true purpose. It was, he said, desirable “more as a measure of social discipline than as a source of revenue.” Hamilton had his central government, and now he was eager to have it display its whip hand.
In 1794, President George Washington led an army the size of that which had won the Revolution into western Pennsylvania to let the hoi polloi know who was boss. It wasn’t about whiskey or taxes. It was about authority. A few prisoners were rounded up; two were sentenced to death but pardoned; and 25 or so were fined for “assisting and abetting in setting up a seditious pole in opposition to the laws of the United States” — a liberty pole, in other words, just like those to which Americans had rallied in support of throwing off the British yoke.
It’s gone downhill ever since. These days it’s virtually impossible to enter a government building without emptying your pockets, walking through a metal detector and doffing one’s cap to the uniformed representative of authoritah.
“We The People,” my ass. In setting itself over and above the rest of us, government has also set itself apart from the rest of us. In developing its own interests and priorities distinct from — and often opposed to — those of the people whom it allegedly serves, government has relinquished any rightful claim on the people’s loyalty.
Remember this, and remember it well: Government serves itself first and foremost. We’re an afterthought at best and, more often than not, an obstacle to be overcome. Government is inherently an alien institution and its employees are at all times an occupation force. It’s about time we recognized that and started treating them accordingly.
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![[info]](http://l-stat.livejournal.com/img/community.gif) anarchists
![[info]](http://l-stat.livejournal.com/img/userinfo.gif) jay_m_s | |
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Hey yall... So... Orlando Food Not Bombs and Atlanta Food Not Bombs are organizing an action outside of Atlanta's U.S. Court of Appeals. For those who live near Atlanta: Dec 17th Noon 56 Forsyth Street N.W., Atlanta, Georgia USA But you don't have to live in or near Atlanta to get involved:
Public Service Announcement (PSA)
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
December 4, 2009
CONTACT:
Food Not Bombs
menu@foodnotbombs.net
575-770-3377
THE FOOD NOT BOMBS GLOBAL DAY OF ACTION
To Support The Right To Free Speech
Thursday, December 17, 2009
Free speech and food outside federal courts and U.S. Embassies all over the
world. Local times and locations to be posted at www.foodnotbombs.net
Efforts to silence Food Not Bombs are underway in cities all across the
United States. This case could finally end these arrests, fines and
confiscations of banners and literature.
Attorney Jacqueline Dowd will represent Orlando Food Not Bombs in oral
arguments to defend the groups right to free speech on December 17th at the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Judicial Circuit, 56 Forsyth Street
N.W., Atlanta, Georgia USA
For the first time, a judge has ruled that sharing food with hungry and
homeless people in a public park is expressive conduct protected by the
First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.
That’s the most important part of the federal court ruling that
Orlando’s “large-group feeding” ordinance is unconstitutional. The
ripple effects of the ruling could reach cities across the country where
ordinances restricting efforts to feed hungry and homeless people are being
considered.
The court ruled that the Orlando ordinance violates the rights of Orlando
Food Not Bombs and the First Vagabonds Church of God to free speech and
free exercise of religion.
To establish that their conduct is expressive and protected by the First
Amendment, the members of Food Not Bombs had to prove that they are
conveying a message that is likely to be understood by the public. The city
tried to argue that their message – that society can and should provide
food for all of its members, regardless of wealth – wasn’t likely to be
understood. But Mayor Buddy Dyer testified that he believes that Food Not
Bombs provides food to the homeless only to convey its political message
– not necessarily to help the homeless.
http://www.foodnotbombs.net
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status | |
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I hate to report but our notification system has gone offline due to code related problems. We have our engineers working as quickly as possible to remedy the situation. At this point we are queuing up all of the notifications to be sent out as soon as a fix is implemented. Thanks |
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econlib | |
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http://econlog.econlib.org/archives/2009/12/book_1_and_book.html Paul Gregory writes,
China and russia in the 1980s offer a unique case study in why some reforms work and others do not. The contrast refutes the notion that a strong, perhaps totalitarian state, is required for successful reform. In the Russian case, a one-party state attempted to impose reform from above and failed. In China, a one-party state opened the economy but resisted grassroots reforms, which it grudgingly accepted after their success could no longer be denied. For decades, a small group of Russian liberals lobbied in vain for reform. They finally got their chance when a reform-minded party leader was elected, but there was no real constituency for reform. In China, there was a massive grassroots constituency which clearly understood reform's potential benefits. They acted quietly on their own, according to the Chinese saying, "Do more but say less; do everything but say nothing." The Chinese rural population, as outsiders, had nothing to lose. With more than 80 percent of Chinese people pushing for change, reform could not help but penetrate the social and economic psychology of the Chinese mind.
His thesis is that China's reforms succeeded because they came from the bottom up, but Russia's reforms failed because they came from the top down. The issue of decentralized order vs. central plans is a main theme in both Book 1 and Book 2. In From Poverty to Prosperity, we talk about what William Easterly calls the difference between "searchers" and "planners" (and we interview Easterly). In Unchecked and Unbalanced, I talk about the discrepancy between dispersed knowledge and concentrated power. My goal is to interest people in bottom-up reforms.
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econlib | |
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http://econlog.econlib.org/archives/2009/12/ny_times_non-re.html If you want to see a great example of a purported news story in which the reporters try to bias the story one way, check out today's New York Times story on Climategate.
I preface this by saying that I am no expert on climate change. My point is not that those who think it's happening, that it's manmade, and that it could cause serious problems are wrong. My point, rather, is that this news story is a case study in how to write things if you want to bias the discussion.
Here are the opening grafs [short for paragraphs], with my comments following:
Just two years ago, a United Nations panel that synthesizes the work of hundreds of climatologists around the world called the evidence for global warming "unequivocal."
This is the first graf. Normally, reporters are taught to use the first graf to say the most important thing. News, as the term suggests, is about what's new. The NYT has reported many times that the UN panel finds the evidence for global warming "uneqivocal" or other synonyms. That's not news. In a normal news story, the UN panel's view would be reported, but it would be reported as a reaction to the facts. Yet that's the first thing reported. Obvious motive: get the reader to think, going in, that, whatever else he knows or thinks he knows, one thing he knows is that there's no real controversy.
But as representatives of about 200 nations converge in Copenhagen on Monday to begin talks on a new international climate accord, they do so against a background of renewed attacks on the basic science of climate change.
Tell the reader that the various critics are attacking the science. How do you attack the science? Well, by being unscientific, of course. But aren't some of the critics themselves wearing the mantle of science? Well, yes, but let's not deviate from the script here.
The debate, set off by the circulation of several thousand files and e-mail messages stolen from one of the world's foremost climate research institutes, has led some who oppose limits on greenhouse gas emissions, and at least one influential country, Saudi Arabia, to question the scientific basis for the Copenhagen talks.
Finally, in the third graf, we get to the news item. This might be news to New York Times readers who read nothing else. But, as pretty much everyone who follows the blogosphere knows, it's not really news.
Sidebar: This reminds me of two lines in the latest 30 Rock [at about the 11:40 point].
Jenna: You've got to lie to her, coddle her, protect her from the real world.
Jack: I get it. Treat her like the New York Times treats its readers.
Notice someone interesting, though. The most important fact the New York Times sees fit to tell about the files is that they were stolen. Now, I have a problem with theft too, but at this point, is that the most important thing about the files? Newspapers often report using information that their sources stole. Do the reporters tell us what the files actually say? No. Notice also that it does introduce the idea that the files have led some to question the scientific basis, but instead of quoting scientists who question it, it refers only to a government, and a not very reputable one at that. These guys are good.
The uproar has threatened to complicate a multiyear diplomatic effort already ensnared in difficult political, technical and financial disputes that have caused leaders to abandon hopes of hammering out a binding international climate treaty this year.
Notice the emotive words: "complicate," "ensnared," "difficult," "abandon hopes." Who wants to take the side of people who complicate things, make things difficult, and cause people to abandon hope?
In recent days, an array of scientists and policy makers have said that nothing so far disclosed -- the correspondence and documents include references by prominent climate scientists to deleting potentially embarrassing e-mail messages, keeping papers by competing scientists from publication and making adjustments in research data -- undercuts decades of peer-reviewed science.
Finally, in the fifth paragraph, which, in my local newspaper, the Monterey County Herald, didn't show up until you turned to the continuation of the story on page 11, they give us more specifics. Moreover, although it finally gives us some idea of the upset, it doesn't let the facts stand alone. The reporters lead in by telling us that an array of scientists and policy makers say it's no big deal. It's also true that an array of scientists and policy makers say it is a big deal. But the reporters don't report that. Also, nowhere do the reporters report that scientists at East Anglia University threw away their data.
Yet the intensity of the response highlights that skepticism about global warming persists, even as many scientists thought the battle over the reality of human-driven climate change was finally behind them.
The quick impression a reader will get from the above graf is that none of the skepticism exists in the mind of scientists.
On dozens of Web sites and blogs, skeptics and foes of greenhouse gas restrictions take daily aim at the scientific arguments for human-driven climate change. The stolen material was quickly seized upon for the questions it raised about the accessibility of raw data to outsiders and whether some data had been manipulated.
This graf is beautiful. The reporters undercut the importance by emphasizing that foes of GHG restrictions are using the Climategate information and that they take daily aim. So this latest info is simply grist for their mill. Actually, I think the reporters are right on this one. But some of the skeptics and "foes," at least, are taking aim with scientific arguments, a fact that the reporters avoid.
I could go on. The remaining grafs are in the same vein.
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anarchists
little_e_ | |
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In the US, the institution of racism has served as a tool used by the white power structure to oppress blacks. Racism has taken many forms, from laws which made black people slaves to laws which merely criminalize black activities more than white. One of the manifestations of this racism is the white practice of mocking black stereotypes to white audiences for white fun--the most famous example of which are blackface minstrel acts. In these acts, a white people don black makeup in a manner similar to the whiteface makeup worn by clowns, wigs, costumes, etc., and then act out stereotyped caricatures of black people. The shows served to define what "black" meant to whites, what white did not mean, and gave white people a chance to laugh at blacks. In short, it reinforced and embodied the racist power structure. While blackface shows have died out in the US due to popular disapproval, the custom of caricaturing other races for fun and profit has not. Most recently, Pikake brought a Ghetto Party in Ybor City, Florida, to our attention. The point of such parties is for white people to dress up as black people and enjoy a lovely evening of mocking black stereotypes to make themselves feel superior. Events of this nature serve to further demarcate the artificial line between "white" and "black", show how much better white culture is than black culture, and remind everyone that equality is a dream for idiots. This Ghetto Party is an act of oppression, racism wielded to create and enforce social hierarchies and prevent the creation of a just world. If you would like to protest The Ghetto Party, then I recommend you contact the management in charge of the party, and the Crowbar, the club where the event will be held. Additionally, here is the address for the skate park of Tampa, which is putting on this event: Skatepark of Tampa, 4215 East Columbus Drive, Tampa, Florida 33605 (813) 621-6793 info@skateparkoftampa.com (Now that is how I recommend making an argument if you want people to listen.)
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particle_mann | |
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After 4 hours of blues last night, there was 2 1/2 hours of trombone this morning, and then I came back to my parents' place and pulled out the trumpet. My youngest brother is playing with me at my next real gig, and we went over the music together.
My brother was always a monster on trumpet. Range, sound, musicality...of the three of us, the middle bro had the talent, but the youngest was the only one with both the talent and the work ethic to have really made it as a pro musician, if he had chosen that path for thimself. How I wound up actually being the musician of the family, I'm not really sure.
He was also an insufferable prick for much of his youth :P
We've only just really started to get to know each other in the last year or so, and we've never really gotten a chance to play with each other, until now. The two hours we spent today, going over parts, cleaning up rhythms, checking each other's high notes... they revealed that he's definitely still got it, I've come a long way from where I used to be (though he still sounds better), and thanks to the practice I'm not worried about the show anymore. Oh, I'll still run the tunes a few times between now and rehearsal, but I feel pretty confident about the whole thing.
Beyond that though, even though it was two hours of solid work, it was just really cool to stand side by side with my brother and share some good music with him. My brothers and I love each other, but it's the two that have always been close with each other, and I'm definitely the odd man out. All three of us musicians, but never really musicians together. And this may be the last chance we get for a while too-he told me his wanderlust is taking him to the foreign service, if he can get in. So...I do believe it's good that I took the chance where I got it. It may not come again, and I wouldn't trade the experience for the world.
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daviddfriedman | |
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http://daviddfriedman.blogspot.com/2009/12/aids-in-africa-disturbing-evidence.html In the U.S. and Europe, AIDS transmission via vaginal intercourse seems to be very low, with sexual transmission occurring mainly via anal intercourse—one reason why the infection rate is much higher among male homosexuals than in the general population. It is widely believed that this is not true in Africa, that, due perhaps to the prevalence of genital sores, vaginal transmission rates are high enough to provide much of the explanation of the very high rates of AIDS infection. As a result of references in an online discussion, I recently came across two published articles which offer evidence that this explanation is wrong, that vaginal transmission rates in Africa are not substantially higher than elsewhere. They go on to suggest that what is really going on may be iatrogenic, doctor caused, disease, that much of the transmission may be due to sloppy medical procedures, in particular the reuse of needles for injections. The evidence is in part from the pattern of infection—rates are apparently much too high among young people who have not had sex and whose mothers are not HIV positive, suggesting a non-sexual transmission mechanism. In part it is from studies that try to measure the transmission rate via vaginal intercourse. In part it is from regional patterns that don't fit the patterns of the supposed causes. The articles are: Evidence of iatrogenic HIV transmission in children in South Africa
and
HIV infections in sub-Saharan Africa not explained by sexual or vertical transmissionMy non-expert impression is that they represent serious scientific work, and that the evidence presented is pretty convincing. The implication is that this is a case of people trying to do good and doing harm instead, always disturbing. Does any reader know of later work either confirming or rebutting the argument?
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http://daviddfriedman.blogspot.com/2009/12/dishwasher-woes.html A while back, we replaced our dishwasher, which came with the house when we bought it some fourteen years ago. The new one, selected on the basis of a positive online discussion of the previous model in the (Bosch) line, turned out to be in almost all ways worse than the old. It held fewer dishes, cleaned less well, dried much less well. It's only significant advantage, so far as we could see, was that it was quieter. It is bad enough so that we are considering simply throwing out our new dishwasher and replacing it with another, after doing a more thorough job of research.
It occurred to me to wonder whether part of the problem had to do with pressure, either from the market or from regulation, for energy efficiency. The external dimensions of a built-in dishwasher are fixed. One way of making it more energy efficient is by putting on more insulation to make it easier to keep things hot while they are being washed—which also makes it quieter. More insulation is likely to mean thicker insulation, which means less space for dishes. Along similar lines, the new dishwasher, unlike the old, doesn't have the option of hot air drying—dishes are dried (or not dried) only by the residual heat from the washing. That saves energy, but makes the dishwasher a good deal less useful.
Does anyone reading this know enough about dishwasher engineering to say whether new dishwashers are, typically, worse than old for these reasons? Whether, if so, the problem is energy efficiency standards set by regulation, or merely the advantage of being able to advertise energy efficiency and low noise?
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Данный фильм, абстрагируясь от некоторых сильных сторон, таких как хорошие актеры и спецэффекты, неприятен двумя вещами. Во-первых, уродливой и недоразвитой темой религии/антирелигии. Во-вторых, сильным уклоном в левые штампы. Сначала о религии. Её в фильме просто нет. Казалось бы, тема Судного Дня должна стать благотворной почвой для любых околорелигиозных сентиментов, морализации или хотя бы интересного сценария. Нужно сказать прямо: Судный День есть тема эксклюзивно библейская, вне зависимости от того, во что верует режиссёр Эммерих. Однако в фильме нет ничего! Или почти ничего. Молящихся людей показывают ровно 3,5 секунды- и то какие-то дешевые нарезки из хроники хаджа и стенающих иудеев. Разве что упоминание "премьер-министра Италии, который решил положиться на молитву" вызывает подобие ироничного чувства. Все остальные персонажи практически не выказывают своей принадлежности к религии - за исключением харизматичного Саши, чью роль исполнил эстонский актёр Йоханн Урб. Саша крестится, посадив АН-225 "Мрия" на краю пропасти прежде чем (SPOILERS) рухнуть туда вместе с самолётом. Все остальные верующие миллиарды, которым суждено погибнуть - безголосы. Но и вне рамок религии экзистенциональные вопросы максимально притушены в пользу action. Как вели себя люди в последние часы? Грабили, пьянствовали, дарили цветы друг другу? Некоторые, конечно, звонили родителям - но это и так ясно. На крупный план подобных звонков ушло минут 30 времени. Приняли ли люди идею возмездия за грех или восприняли происходящее как бессмысленную бойню? Ответа попросту нет никакого, в результате сюжет совершенно куцый, игра актёров пресная и повторяющаяся. Правда, католический проповедник Barron говорит о том, что фильм всё-таки анти-христианский, поскольку все верующие персонажи в этом фильме гибнут (!), а с некоторой симпатией (буквально минута) показана лишь буддийская этика. So wrong! Гибель верующих никоим образом не делает фильм антихристианским, даже если режиссёр что-то и пытался из себя выдавить - проблема-то в том, что гибель верующих безголоса, кадры обрезаны со всех сторон и занимают буквально секунды. И это в фильме, где спасённого мальчика зовут Ноа, а корабли называются Arcs! Сентименты все или дешёвые (попытки попрощаться по телефону) или повторяющиеся (инстинкт спасения детей и бедными, и богатыми) Но больше нераскрытой темы религии в фильме меня разозлила разнузданная апология социализма в сценарии. (Далее СПОЙЛЕРЫ!) Подозреваю, что сценарий помогал писать Майкл Мур - кто ещё способен на такой бред? Правительство в тайне строит Три с Половиной корабля, чтобы спасти 0,005% населения Земли. Для постройки кораблей привлекается "частный капитал" - потенциальным клиентам предлагают купить билеты стоимостью 1 миллиард евро за человека. В результате, совместными усилиями китайских рабочих и арабских шейхов 7 или 8 Ковчегов готовы к Судному Дню. Спасутся лишь "отобранные правительством люди", олигархи с питомцами и само Правительство, точнее Правительства Большой Восьмёрки. Главный герой, очутившись в каюте корабля, с возмущением швыряет на пол бокал от шампанского и вопит:" Wat is dis?? Сюда же можно было 10 человек напихать вместо меня одного". Здесь я смеялся в первый раз за фильм (второй - когда нувориш заводил Bentley голосовым управлением). В корабли грузят слонов и носорогов вместо того, чтобы просто взять образцы их генов - в итоге оказывается, что Африка-то спаслась! И в ней миллион слонов и миллиард христиан, а также полмиллиарда мусульман. Их товарищи с Ковчегов будут поить шампанским и обороняться от этой орды боевыми сумочками от Гуччи. Колонистов-то всего 400 тысяч гламурных тёток, без боевой авиации, танков и заводов амуниции. То-то позабавятся сомалийские пираты. Всё это - явная оголтелая антиглобалистская агитация. Вдумаемся - три года планета потребляет и производит кучу капитальных товаров, не зная, что скоро всему конец. Вместо того, чтобы производить подводные корабли, миллионы заводов производят автомобили. Вместо оружия производится мебель из красного дерева. Вместо сложной строительной техники - инвалидные коляски для пенсионеров, которые в потопе не выживут. Реальная проблема человечества не в том, что "недостаточно капитала" и нужно привлекать олигархов (как это внушают сценаристы), а в том, что искажены временные горизонты. Какой нормальный человек, имея информацию, будет копить депозиты в банке или покупать виллы с видом на океан? Своевременное адаптирование капитала позволило бы построить сотни и тысячи "Ковчегов", а не 7 штук. И тогда не нужно подстрекать пролетарскую ненависть к жирному олигарху Юрию, который может себе купить право на жизнь, а "мои детки не могут". В этом фильме описан первый случай за всю историю, когда правительство из страха огласки боялось тратить деньги налогоплательщиков. Злой Директор Мира там роняет фразу: "Если бы им рассказали, начался бы хаос. Поэтому мы их убили". Говорится это всё назидательно, соглашаются все, даже антиглобалистский негр-учёный, швырявшийся бокалом. Тот самый негр, который сел на корабль, хотя мог уступить своё место. Как это похоже на вашингтонских бюджетников! В фильме есть бюджетники левые и бюджетники правые, еще толстые олигархи и юркие пролетарии, пролезающие на борт. Можно было бы показать деятельность обычных людей, ЗНАЮЩИХ о своей перспективе - тех же верующих. Заодно бы проверили, начался бы хаос или нет, и где сильнее - в мире Третьем, Втором или Первом. Религиозном или Атеистическом? Режиссёр Эммерих так и не дал никому шанса продемонстрировать этический аспект разных культур. Уже не в первый раз - предыдущий фильм-катастрофа "Послезавтра" был столь же пресен, антиэтичен, уныло эмоционален. Прогнозирую - данный фильм будет необычайно популярен в авторитарных и морально-релятивистских обществах, увязших в антинравственной ментальности - Франции, Швеции, России, КНР, Украине, Венесуэле. Ни для религиозных людей, ни для либертарианцев-агностиков, ни даже для безбожных экзистенциалистов - почти никакой пищи для разума. UPD.Выношу из комментариев Отсюда также становится понятно, что правительство НЕ УСПЕВАЛО расходовать деньги на постройку челноков, потому что этих денег было слишком много. Но своих целей оно достигло - построило челноки для себя любимого в полной тайне, в то время как остальной мир захлебнулся, сидя на несметных богатствах и технологиях. Это чистый сталинизм. Tags: libertarianism
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Previous 
hopeful
